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Abstract: 
This paper estimates sustainable coverage and competitive effects of entry for Swiss newspaper sellers which 
sell composite goods, including a range of other products such as food and near-food items. It utilises the applied 
entry threshold ratio methodology from Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), which allows estimation even when the 
range of products under examination is not exactly defined and when price and quantity data are not available. It 
is found that under monopoly pricing, single firm entry is sustainable in communes with a market size of over 482 
people (leaving 310 Swiss communes without a selling point). With duopoly prices, instead, a first firm would only 
be able to enter a market with 921 people (leaving another 263 communes, corresponding to 2,1% of the 
population, without coverage). There are therefore tangible benefits from above duopoly prices in monopoly 
regions. Thus, a clear and quantifiable trade-off between prices in monopoly regions and coverage exists. 
Moreover, it is found that a second entrant in this market strongly increases competition, while further entry 
doesn‟t have significant additional competitive effects. From a welfare perspective, therefore, “two is enough” to 
ensure competition in this market. It is shown that this is not the case in some other retail markets, where entry by 
a third firm may significantly affect competition. Finally, using the estimation results, it is show that the public 
policy, which consisted of having the government controlled Swiss Post enter the newspaper sellers‟ retail market, 
was not optimal as it was focused on urban areas where neither coverage nor competition could be enhanced, 
while risking competitive distortions. At the same time, it is shown that there are communes in which such a 
government policy may be welfare enhancing.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2369040 
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1. Introduction 
This paper estimates sustainable coverage and competitive effects of entry for Swiss newspaper 
sellers which sell composite goods, including a range of other products such as food and near-food 
items. It is found that when communes are not too small, the presence of one or more newspaper 
selling points can be sustained by the free market. Moreover, the effect of a second entrant on 
competition is shown to be strong, while subsequent entry does not have further significant impact on 
competition. This result is important, as there was repeated direct public intervention in local 
newspaper sellers‟ markets (by the Swiss Post) which are shown to be competitive. Moreover, it is 
shown that the market dynamics on the distribution market may also affect upstream competition 
between newspaper publishers, as, for instance, in the absence of local sales channels entry barriers 
are increased.  
The media is often called the fourth
1
 of Montesquieu‟s three powers of the state and a founding pillar 
of modern democracy (Montesquieu (1751)). People like Alain Peyrefitte and Thomas Jefferson 
argued that a society needs freedom of speech and the freedom of press
2
 to ensure checks and 
balances between the people and the three traditional powers. In Switzerland, for instance, freedom of 
the press seems to be granted in general by the legal, political and economic framework. Freedom 
House ranks Switzerland respectively fourth, third and fifth in the world (Freedom House, 2012). In this 
setting legal freedom of the press alone is, however, not a sufficient condition for efficient public 
information. It is recognised that the press in general has the ability to influence the public opinion. 
This can occur through a topic selection bias, e.g. by omitting relevant information or by publishing 
biased information. Sufficient competition between journals might provide for optimal horizontal 
differentiation (Salop, 1979), leading to a homogeneous coverage of all topics “requested” by readers 
– and eliminating to a large extent a possible topic selection bias or biased opinions in the industry as 
a whole. Bignon and Miscio (2010) show that competition between newspapers produces coverage of 
all relevant information in the market. (Blasco & Sobbrio, 2012) show that a sufficiently high degree of 
competition in the market for newspaper drives out possible media biases also in relation to particular 
interests of advertisers and review relevant literature. Freedom House notes that in practice, despite a 
good overall ranking, the situation in Switzerland is not unproblematic as large publishing houses 
control most of the print sector and that concentration of ownership has forced many stand-alone 
newspapers to merge or shut down. A lack of competition implying a local informational bias might 
therefore potentially represent a democratic challenge. Such an issue might be particularly relevant in 
Swiss regions (cantons) and communes where political decisions are regularly put at vote
3
.  
In addition to freedom of the press and competition between publishers, accessibility also matters. The 
public should be able to access information without unreasonable effort. In rural areas, for example, if 
there are no newspaper selling points in the commune, it may be difficult for a citizen not subscribed to 
a newspaper to find a newspaper to buy nearby. This article analyses under which circumstances 
entry and therefore coverage is viable. It is concluded that only in 310 from 2‟700 communes 
(corresponding to 1% of Swiss population) no selling point is economically viable. Moreover, the 
impact of entry on monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly newspaper seller markets in Swiss communes is 
assessed. An entry threshold model based on Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) is used to estimate 
                                               
1
 The idea of the Fourth Power is not explicitly found in Montesquieu. It appears during the first part of the 19
th
 
Century in writings Thomas Carlyle (Carlyle, 1993) citing British politician Edmund Burke (1729-1797). Carlyle 
and others as Macaulay coined the expression Fourth Estate to describe an informational power, which included 
the political reporters of the Press, but also, in a larger sense, all writers and the entire institution of literature. In 
modern times the fourth branch or power has a meaning which includes other mass media such as TV and radio.  
2
 Jefferson (1787): “The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to 
keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or 
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.” 
3
 More concretely, a citizen of the commune of Zürich needs to be able to participate at votes on four dates per 
year on 25 law proposals often very different in their nature and at a general election. This requires a large and 
broad amount of local information in order to be able to make sufficiently informed choices. 
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minimum demand levels necessary for entry of a specific number of firms as well as the impact of 
entry on newspaper sellers average variable profits. Most importantly, these estimates show that in 
communes with only one newspaper seller, there are considerable margins, while margins are strongly 
reduced when a competitor enters (considering their full product portfolio). Entry by subsequent 
competitors is shown to have no significant further effects on margins. It is shown that this is a 
particular feature of the Swiss newspaper sellers‟ market and that in different other retail markets entry 
of a third firm also has substantial competitive effects. While the high profitability of monopoly selling 
points may be seen by some as a problem, it is argued that it has also a positive effect, increasing the 
geographical coverage of newspaper selling points. More concretely, it is shown that when a 
monopolist would be able to charge only duopoly prices, coverage would be lost in 263 communes 
(2,1% of the population). There are therefore tangible benefits from above duopoly prices and a clear 
and quantifiable trade-off between prices in monopoly regions and coverage exists. For a detailed 
theoretical model regarding the interplay of local competition, investment and coverage with two firms 
and increasing fixed costs towards rural areas, the reader may refer to Bourreau, Cambini and 
Hoernig (2012). Unlike newspapers, the availability of other media like TV, Radio or the Internet is 
usually largely independent from geographically located intermediaries. Nevertheless, coverage 
matters, especially for broadband Internet where coverage is not available in some rural areas. Such 
other forms of media will be shown to not represent valid substitutes to newspapers (not sufficient in-
depth information) to date. In addition, local radio and TV stations are often not available in rural 
areas. The impact of other forms of media is therefore largely abstracted from in the model.  
It is additionally argued in this article that the relatively strong margin earned by monopoly newspaper 
selling points over the whole range of products sold, may not only be beneficial to accessibility, but 
may also correspond to increased competition between newspaper publishers. Regarding this second 
effect, Shapiro and Varian (1999) show that newspapers (and information services in general) are 
experience goods; consumer must experience them to value them. To be able to efficiently compete, 
firms must therefore offer consumers a way to easily experience the good before committing to a 
subscription. The easiest way to experience a newspaper is usually to buy a single copy at a selling 
point. While newspaper selling point sales may well have a lower weight than subscription sales when 
considering total sales of publishers, they may play a crucial role during entry for acquisition of 
customers, and be a prerequisite for effective competition between newspapers. If all newspaper 
selling point sales channels in an area were to disappear, this would clearly increase experience costs 
(and entry barriers) and therefore correspond to less upstream competition between editors. 
Concretely, for instance, it might be very difficult for a new small local newspaper to gain a customer 
base in rural area, where nearly no selling points are available. Paradoxically, high (overall) retail 
profitability of newspaper selling points can therefore increase total coverage (accessibility) and 
thereby competition between editors
4
 (reducing informational bias) - potentially benefiting the public in 
two distinct ways. These benefits do, however, not come without a cost, which may be mainly related 
to relatively higher prices of the whole portfolio of goods sold by newspaper sellers in areas with 
limited competition.  
This paper consists of a series of chapters laying down a theoretical model, adjusting it to the case 
under analysis and analysing econometric results. Chapter 2 describes the market environment in 
newspaper distribution as well as publishing markets in Switzerland. In Chapter 3, the current public 
policy in place will be described. Chapter 4 describes the theoretical model used in this paper and 
Chapter 5 its practical econometric adaption to the Swiss newspaper sellers market. Subsequently, 
Chapter 6 describes the data used. Chapter 7 summarizes regression results and as well as minimum 
                                               
4
 It should be noted here that competition at wholesale level is not generally independent of retail competition. 
Inderst and Valletti (2007) show how retail competition affects wholesale competition via indirect effects. In 
practice an upstream supplier may be unable to raise (upstream) prices substantially above competitive levels as 
this would make its retailers less competitive and customers may switch to retailers of the competitor. This may 
be the case when there are different wholesale suppliers or a vertically integrated firm. Here, as will be shown, 
there is a publishing-wholesale distribution monopoly supplying inputs to all retailers. In such case there are no 
indirect effects. 
  PAGE 4 DE 34 
demand levels necessary for entry (entry thresholds). In addition, entry threshold ratios, indicating the 
effect of entry on profitability are calculated. Finally, Chapter 8 makes policy recommendation based 
on these results and Chapter 9 concludes.  
2. Market environment 
The newspaper distribution market is part of a complex system of up- and downstream markets 
(Figure 1). Generally, there is a two-sided newspaper market where readers buy newspapers and read 
them and an advertising market were advertisers buy advertising space in these newspapers (higher 
readership is typically associated with higher prices). Newspapers are then distributed in two different 
ways: one is distribution through the subscription channel where copies are sent to a home address of 
the customer and distribution through newspaper selling points, where usually there are wholesalers 
and retailers involved. These markets and their relationships are described in the following sections.  
Newspaper and 
magazine  
publishers
Wholesaler 1 
(e.g. Valora)
Subscribers
Distributor 
(e.g. Post)
R1 R2 R3 R4
Consumers
x
Advertising 
customers
 
Figure 1 - Dependencies between the players in the newspaper value chain (OFT, 2009) 
 
On the reader market side, publishers compete to supply newspapers to consumers by charging a 
cover price for print copies (whether distributed singly, over the counter, or by subscription). On the 
other side of the market, both free and non-free newspapers compete for advertising revenues.  
 
Possible media substitutes  
In general, competition authorities have regarded TV, radio and Internet content as distinct markets 
from printed press mostly because there is a different range and depth of information (e.g. European 
Commission in Recoletos / Unedisa or UK Competition Commission, in the Newsquest Ltd 
Independent News and Media plc). In particular, for the OFT (2009) it is often possible for newspapers 
to cover more of the background to a news story than can be covered in TV or radio news. The U.S. 
Department of Justice (2011) has a similar view. It states that it had concluded in past investigations 
that non-newspaper media do not sufficiently constrain the pricing of single newspapers, 
advertisements, the pricing of newspaper subscriptions or newspapers‟ investments in news and 
editorial content and thus are not in the same market. It does, however, not exclude future changes in 
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this definition
5
. In Switzerland, the Competition Appeal Authority broadly shares these views and sees 
radio, TV and the Internet as complements to the newspaper readers markets rather than as 
substitutes (Berner Zeitung AG/Tamedia AG/Wettbewerbskommission
6
 and Tamedia AG/Espace 
Media). In addition, it does not consider mobile online news as a substitute to commuters dailies 
(accessed and read while commuting to work, e.g. in the train), among other things because of the 
small size of mobile phone displays. 
In an early study, Ahlers (2006) shows that, in practice, there was a certain migration of traditional 
reading to online reading, but that the magnitude was limited. The study shows that at that time only 
12% of U.S. adults were Internet news only users. This confronts with 22% of multichannel (on- and 
offline news readers) and 43% of offline only news readers. However, this is confirmed by a MIS study 
for Switzerland (M.I.S. Trend, 2009), which states that only 22% of users often use their Internet 
connection to read the press news (26% from time to time). This is again confirmed by a recent study 
by Latzer et al. (2012) which states that only 6% of Internet users do not read print newspapers at all 
and that 83% of them regularly read print newspapers
7
. More than by the content or the niches chosen 
by online or printed news the choice may be largely motivated also by habit and accessibility (Van der 
Wurff (2011)). The available information today therefore seems to indicate that, overall, it is not 
unreasonable to consider the printed press in Switzerland as still a separate market from radio, TV 
and Internet today and when viewing historical data from the beginning of the 21th Century. 
 
Different types of press products and local potential coverage 
Newspaper publishers produce a wide range of press products. The Swiss Competition Commission 
defines a market for free commuters‟ dailies independent from the market for other daily newspapers. 
Such commuters‟ dailies are usually characterized by very short news without providing further 
analysis. Commuter‟s dailies are distributed for free at central nodes of the public transportation 
system (also using distribution boxes instead of newspaper selling points). A central feature of such 
press products is their free and timely accessibility in trains when people are commuting. Such 
accessibility, it concludes, is not given to a sufficient degree by other media such as radio, TV and the 
Internet (although this may change in the future for example with e-readers). Regarding other 
newspapers, the Commission thinks that commuters‟ dailies may not satisfy the needs of a typical 
reader of a traditional newspaper and that they are therefore to be largely considered as 
complements. It also states that very few readers seem to exclusively read commuters‟ dailies. The 
market entry of the largest commuters‟ daily “20 minutes”, is stated to have had a significant negative 
impact on single copy sales (dropping around 25% in seven years)
8
, but that in the more important 
subscriptions market (from a revenue point of view) such a significant reduction could not be verified
9
. 
For this reason their overall substitutability with traditional newspapers seems to be limited. While the 
Competition Commission did not make a binding decision in this respect, the appeal body has 
corrected this by subsequently deciding that there would be no sufficient substitutability with other 
newspapers and that the reduction of single copy sales may also have other reasons
10
. Regarding 
magazines, the OFT affirms that on the demand side, there is a wide range of magazine on different 
subjects and that it would seem unlikely that consumers would substitute, for any given title, another 
title that had very different content. That would suggest magazines are forming a number of product 
markets based on their content, target audience and frequency of publication (OFT, 2009). The Swiss 
                                               
5
 The U.S. Department of Justice further states that “this conclusion is perfectly consistent with the observation 
that newspapers have been losing subscription and advertising revenues to other media, as some degree of 
competition across market boundaries is the norm. Whether changes in technology and consumer preferences 
may lead to the conclusion that a relevant market should include sales of advertisements (or content) by both 
newspapers and other media remains something that should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.” 
6
 RPW 2006/2, p.375 
7
 Note that 7% of total users indicate that they have cancelled a newspaper subscription because the information 
was also available on the Internet. 
8
 Berner Zeitung AG/20 Minuten 
9
 Berner Zeitung AG/20 Minuten, RPW 2004/2, p. 540 
10
 Berner Zeitung AG, Tamedia AG/Wettbewerbskommission in RPW 2006/2, p.347 
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Competition Commission has taken a similar position in its proceedings when affirming that there is a 
separate readers market for different types of magazines
11
. More importantly, it also defines a series 
of related markets in this context: 1) daily newspapers, which include local, regional, national and 
international news, 2) a market for newspaper advertising at national level 3) a market for newspaper 
advertising at regional and local level and finally 4) analogous separate advertising markets on 
local/regional as well as national level for radio and for TV advertising
12
. The Commission then even 
proceeds to define the specific geographic boundaries of each local/regional newspaper and 
advertisement market based mainly on their local reach. Some markets were even defined to be 
smaller than cantons. Nevertheless, it is found that there are even in urban regions high 
concentrations in daily (local) newspapers markets
13
.  
There are various studies analysing competition between local newspapers (Dewenter, 2003). In 
general the conclusion is that as a consequence of economies of scale in advertising and news 
production, in many cases, rural areas simply cannot support more than one newspaper publisher with 
regional coverage implying high market power. Empirical estimations of competition between 
newspapers are rare, given the complex nature of newspapers as a platform for readers and 
advertisers. There is literature that is arguing that in some cases, regions may overlap, leading to 
higher competition in overlap areas (Dertouzos & Trautman, 1990). This seems, however, as shown 
by the Swiss Competition Commission, to be rarely the case in Switzerland. Even on a national level 
competitive problems seem to arise (Argentesi & Filistrucchi, 2007; Argentesi & Ivaldi, 2005). The 
problem of market power of local newspapers is – at least in rural areas – in Switzerland also widely 
recognized.   
 
From an institutional point of view, this paper focuses on the market for daily newspapers including 
local and regional content (as well as national and international news). This is the only market allowing 
for in depth local news coverage in many rural areas, as often no (sufficiently) local radio or TV station 
is present.    
Single copy sales channel (retail level) 
In general, two channels for the distribution of newspapers are distinguished: subscriptions and single 
copy sales at newspaper selling points. In the distribution and retail business operators offer 
“distribution channels” to distribute their content directly or via intermediaries to final customers at a 
given price. 
An early proceeding by the Swiss Competition Commission has analysed the market for newspaper 
selling points in Swiss train stations
14
. It states that in theory single copy sale of newspaper may be 
possible in the form of a small additional business for a large part of businesses such as Convenience 
stores (selling food and near-food items
15
), tobacconists, etc. This possibility would, however, be 
restricted by the fact that wholesalers might ask for minimum revenues. Moreover in other markets 
restricted search costs a customer is willing to face are defined. For example the Commission had 
concluded that the market radius for small supermarkets to cover “basic shopping needs” is 10 
minutes of travel time
16
. It seems clear that the radius for buying a newspaper would be lower. 
Similarly, the Office of Fair Trading states that the geographic market is likely to be highly localized, in 
particular for newspapers, given the need for convenient local purchases (OFT (2009)). There is 
therefore a very local market for individual newspaper selling points. However, in the model proposed 
                                               
11
 Tamedia AG/Espace Media, RPW 2007/4 P. 605-629 
12
 The differentiation of advertising markets between newspaper and other media seems common as target 
groups and marketing strategies are different. It can be noted here that the U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission had shown that cross-price elasticity between retail ads in local newspapers and radio is very small, 
between local newspapers and TV they even seem to be complementary (Bush, 2002). 
13
 RPW 2007/4 P. 605-629 
14
 RPW 1999/3, p.403-422 
15
 Any other goods of daily use 
16
 Valora/Cevanova, RPW 2009/1, p.77-80 
  PAGE 7 DE 34 
in the next chapters, it is assumed that the geographic markets extend over the area of a commune, 
when considering only small communes. Finally, while from a supply perspective the subscriptions 
channel may be a valid substitute for sales to the single copy sales channel, from the demand side 
there are significant differences. Single copy sales target spontaneous buyers while subscriptions 
target habitual readers. For this reason the, Competition Commission does not see the two channels 
as belonging to the same market. In the model proposed, the newspaper sellers‟ market will therefore 
be considered in isolation.  
Moreover, it should be noted here that single copy sales are particularly important for newly entering 
local newspaper seeking new customers. Shapiro and Varian (1999) show that newspapers (and 
information services in general) are experience goods, i.e. a consumer must experience them to value 
them (see also Nelson (1970))
17
. Experience goods have usually lower price elasticity as consumers 
fear that lower prices may be due to quality issues or unobservable problems. To be able to efficiently 
compete, firms must therefore offer consumers a way to easily experience the good. The marketing 
response to this phenomenon has often been to offer consumers free samples of such goods so that 
they can be aware of their value and (potentially) buy. The easiest way to experience a newspaper is 
usually to buy a single copy at a selling point. Often, publishers also offer trial subscriptions. In this 
case, however, this usually involves signing a cancellable contract for a period of one month or more 
as well as the exchange of address and billing details. If all selling point sales channels in an area 
were to (locally) disappear, this would clearly increase experience costs and entry barriers and 
therefore correspond to less upstream competition between publishers. Concretely, for instance it 
might be very difficult for a new small local newspaper to gain a customer base in rural areas when 
nearly no selling points were available. Paradoxically, therefore, in this market high (overall) retail 
profitability of newspaper selling points can increase total coverage (accessibility) and thereby 
competition between editors upstream (reducing informational bias).  
The market regime in practice is described by the Competitions Commission as foreseeing that 
distributors both at wholesale and at retail level would only be intermediaries (between the publishers 
and the consumers) receiving each commissions for selling newspapers. Unsold copies are returned 
to the publisher at no cost
18
. In the Swiss market the direct largest customer of exclusive wholesaler 
Valora (see also next section) except Valora itself with 20% was Volg, a mainly small rural retailer, 
with about 11% of selling points supplied. Analysing in detail the data at disposal
19
 (Figure 2), 
newspaper sellers seem to nearly always contemporarily sell other goods, most prominently a more or 
less broad range of food and near-food items (kiosks, groceries and petrol station make up for about 
85% of newspaper selling points).  
 
Figure 2 – Number and type of newspaper selling points supplied by Valora, 2008 
                                               
17
 While in practice the informational content of every edition of a newspaper is different, it is assumed that once 
tried consumers can nevertheless value the quality of a particular brand of newspaper.  
18
 RPW 1999/3 
19
 Source: Presstalis 2008 
2383; 34% 
1400; 20% 
1238; 18% 
799; 11% 
388; 6% 
288; 4% 
251; 4% 52; 1% 76; 1% 46; 1% 
Groceries / Food stores 
Valora own* 
Independent Kiosks 
Petrol stations 
Hospitality 
Seasonal 
Others 
Large department stores 
Tobacconists 
Private kiosks in train stations 
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Next to Valora and Volg, Coop stores with about 10% (retailer) and the Swiss Post (government 
control) with about 7% of selling points held considerable buyer shares in 2008. Post offices have for a 
long time distributed newspapers. This aspect will be mentioned in later chapters.   
Single copy sales channel (wholesale) 
A wholesaler of press products is an intermediary between the publisher producing newspapers and 
the retailers selling these products to the customers. A retailer is able to substitute a wholesaler only if 
the alternative wholesaler is able to supply all titles requested. Valora is acting as single exclusive 
wholesaler of (a large range of) press products of German langue titles
20
 in Switzerland. In addition to 
its wholesale business, Valora is, as shown before, controlling also a number of retail newspaper 
selling points (mostly kiosks). 
An important feature of the demand of newspapers of retailers is that they have to arrive soon in the 
morning as after 9 a.m. the units sold strongly decline. The Competition Commission has in the 
indicated merger proceeding defined consequently a wholesale market for the timely (early morning) 
supply of press products to retail newspaper selling points. It assumes that there are substantive 
economies of scale and scope in the logistic process constituting properties of a natural monopoly. It 
states that there would be a potential risk of discrimination in favor of Valora‟s own selling points or 
even of foreclosure and that it would intervene under in case such practices would take place. This 
means that in Switzerland, newspaper selling points should face homogeneous input products when 
compared to Valora (which does not exclude for example volume discounts a priori).  It is also stated 
that such wholesalers may not have a similar dominant position when facing the publishers. These 
may have considerable buying power as they might potentially sign a contract with a new outside firm 
for wholesale distribution (e.g. Post).  
Subscription channel 
For newspaper subscriptions, publishers seem to need to ensure delivery at home before 6.30 a.m. as 
this seems to be, according to the Competition Commission, a requirement of the consumers
21
. 
Normal post delivery is usually completed before 12 a.m. in Switzerland. Nevertheless, the Swiss Post 
is able to ensure early delivery in most of Switzerland, but it has entered this business only very late 
(2007). According to the Commission the market shows properties of a natural (regional) monopoly, as 
the lowest costs are generated when early delivery is ensured by one single firm – similarly to the rest 
of postal services. In some (few) regions there are, however, still parallel early delivery operators 
present today, controlled mainly by local newspapers (sometimes in joint-venture) or the Swiss Post
22
. 
The Commission was critical towards the operators controlled by local newspapers as they could 
exclude new local newspapers. This conclusion has led to the blocking of a local joint-venture between 
the Swiss Post and local newspapers.  
3. Public policy 
The distribution markets under observation described earlier are the single copy as well as the 
subscription channel distribution of daily newspapers, which include local and regional content as well 
as national and international news 
Single copy sales channel (retail level) 
                                               
20
 Exclusivity contracts are signed, RPW 1999/3, p.403-422 
21
 Post/Tamedia/NZZ 
22
 This does not necessarily mean that similar competitive conditions are given for all competitors as the Post for 
example does not need to respect the ban of heavy road transport (over 3,5 tons) on Sundays and during the 
night - the time early delivery has to be organized. 
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The Post, which is still under full government control in Switzerland, has directly entered the 
newspaper retail market at different times. It has sold newspapers to final customers in 1‟200 post 
offices from 1993 to 1998. Then, after a period of seven years, it had again entered this market in 
2005 with 33 newspaper selling points in its post offices (urban and rural areas)
23
 offering a small 
range of press products, including the most important regional and national daily newspapers and 
popular magazines (less than 25 titles in total). During a pilot phase, the Post did not work with Valora. 
Instead, it was directly supplied by the publishers. As the Post ensures early delivery of subscriptions 
for many local newspapers, such an agreement with publishers seemed possible (at least for a certain 
amount of time). Valora
24
 later declared, however, that this agreement would not respect the long 
(exclusive) collaboration with the publishers and that it would engage in discussions with them. 
Subsequently direct negotiations between the publishers and the Swiss Post seemed to break down 
and the Post communicated after the trial in 2007 that it would “from now on” work with Valora. In 
2008, the Post was operating 464 selling points (about 20% of post offices) supplied by Valora. Soon, 
however, Post seems to have entirely abandoned this business. In 2012 the post offices concerned 
seem to sell mainly other products such as stationery items, mobile phones and traveler items.  
Subscription channel 
The new postal law (Postgesetz, art.16)
25
 foresees that newspapers which include local and regional 
content are awarded a reduction in delivery costs of 30 million CHF. Furthermore, 20 million CHF are 
foreseen for magazines of associations and foundations
26
. The delivery price reduction is valid, 
however, only for services under universal service (i.e. services from the Swiss Post). This applies 
therefore not to early delivery (before 12 a.m.), which is a liberalized market (BAKOM, 2012a). A large 
part of subscriptions are therefore not incentivized. To date the price reduction has therefore been 
mainly used by weeklies and a few local newspapers (BAKOM, 2012b). Also, wholesale distributors of 
newspapers to selling points could not profit from these reductions. The main motivation for the above 
provisions is the strong process of concentration of independent local newspapers in Switzerland 
(from 45 in the year 2000 to 32 in 2012). The Competition Commission has shown that in many areas 
there are strong concentrations with local newspaper accounting for often more than 60% of the local 
market share even when taking into account national titles
27
.  
To conclude, the newspaper distribution markets under consideration were affected in the past by the 
entry of public entities in the retail distribution market as well as in the wholesale distribution market for 
subscriptions. In addition there are subsidies for late delivery, which are used, however, only by a 
small fraction of newspapers. The following chapter will analyse the level of competition in the 
newspaper sellers‟ market and the appropriateness of entry of a public entity in this market.  
4. Analytical Framework 
Newspapers are generally sold to generate customer frequency (“foot traffic”) at selling points, 
meaning that people may want to look for a place where to buy a newspaper and once there, they 
would also acquire other products (e.g. food and near-food items, tobacco etc.) (NAA (2012)). In other 
terms, it is held that selling newspapers is having a positive externality, which a newspaper seller 
would typically take into account. Cases would therefore even be possible where the seller has an 
unprofitable standalone business for selling newspapers, but it is reasonable to continue to sell when 
considering the positive externality on other products and services sold. From this point of view a 
                                               
23
http://www.post.ch/post-startseite/post-konzern/post-medien/post-archive/2005/post-mm05-pilotversuch-
zeitungsverkauf/post-medienmitteilungen.htm 
24
 In an interview still in Valora CEO Wüst in 2005 
25
 The development of this law over the years is well explained in Ecoplan (2010) 
26
 No such reduction is awarded to newspapers with a circulation of more than 100‟000 copies. The government 
can add further criteria to award the reductions such as coverage, periodicity, extent of informational part or 
extent of advertising part. 
27
 Tamedia/Espace Media, RPW 2007/4, p.621 
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newspaper selling point satisfies some of the criteria laid down by the Swiss Competition Commission 
to qualify for a two-sided market (namely positive externality), but as there are not two different 
customer groups involved, the property cited can be considered as a simple case of complement
28
. In 
addition, as described earlier, products which are typically sold together with newspapers may be 
many and different in their nature. Analysing entry and competition based on a structural model 
estimating demand and supply using prices and quantities of such products would therefore prove 
impossible. Recent estimation techniques exist, however, which allow empirical measures of 
competition through the observation of sellers‟ entry decisions and general demand and supply 
shifters. This means that it is possible to make inferences on the competitive interactions in a market 
of newspaper sellers considering a composite good sold without the need to collect data on individual 
products supposed to be in the affected market. In such case any complementary or substitutive 
effects between goods sold are internalised.  
Based on Chamberlin (1933) and Panzar and Rosse‟s (1987) theoretical description of free-entry 
competition, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) propose an “entry threshold” model which allows estimates 
of the minimum demand necessary for a specific number of firms to enter the market.  
Entrants may in this model face entry barriers. What is observed from the data is only whether entry 
occurs or not. The entry threshold is then defined as the market size required to sustain the entry of a 
particular number of firms. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) it will be shown how entry 
thresholds ratios provide a scale free measure of the effect of entry on market power. The objective is 
to relate shifts in market demand to changes in the equilibrium number of firms. The degree of 
competitiveness in this market under progressive entry will then be used to evaluate public policy 
relating to newspaper distribution in Switzerland.  
Suppose that d(Z,P) is the demand function of a representative customer, depending on the price of 
the good (P) and some other demand shifting variables Z (e.g. income). Suppose further that S(Y) is 
the number of customers, determined by some variables Y (e.g. population). Then total market 
demand can be expressed by: 
      )(),( YSPZdQd   (1) 
Further fixed costs depending on some exogenous variables W (e.g. real estate availability in the 
commune) may be defined:    
 )(WF  (2) 
For newspapers sellers, typical cost functions of local retailers may apply (as for instance for tire 
dealers in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)). The standard model assumes that a firm‟s average and 
marginal costs are U-shaped. Hence, there are economies of scale at first, and after a certain quantity 
of composite goods sold, diseconomies of scale. Thus, there is a minimum efficient scale (MES) of 
output. It should be noted, that the marginal cost functions related to newspapers alone may (slightly) 
differ. This is assumed, however, to not have a substantial effect on the model, as it can be assumed 
that newspapers only account for a small part of total sales and margins of a typical newspaper seller. 
Still, it should be noted that for the sale of newspapers alone, marginal costs are decreasing or 
possibly constant as wholesale monopolist Valora seems to award quantity discounts
29
 – a form of 
second degree price discrimination - after some levels of output per distribution point are reached 
(identical for all sellers)
30
.  
Consequently, with q being firm output, define       
                                               
28
 Again, as explained by Ordover (2007) this is very similar to analyzing a “two-sided market”.  
29
 Concretely, Valora pays commissions per copy sold increasing with quantity. The fact that retailers do not pay 
for inputs, but are paid by wholesalers for their distribution services, is purely financial and does not change the 
analysis. 
30
 Given the earlier cited decision of the Competition Commission it is likely that the Commission would intervene 
in case of discriminatory prices.  
  PAGE 11 DE 34 
 ),( WqMC     (3) 
 ),( WqAVC  (4)  
It is assumed for simplification that the goods produced are homogeneous products
31
. It is therefore 
assumed that a typical newspaper seller would sell units of a virtual, composite good composed of 
newspapers and other products which are sold together with newspapers (typically some range of 
food and near-food products
32
). P is the corresponding price of such a composite good. There is 
assumed to be price flexibility over the whole range of goods sold. It should be noted, however, that 
such flexibility may not exist for the sale of newspapers alone as newspaper prices are printed on the 
front-page in Switzerland and are also usually charged. Given that newspapers only represent a small 
part of overall sales of newspaper sellers this aspect can again be neglected. As this papers‟ objective 
is to consider all sellers of newspapers, independently of which other products they sell, the model 
proposed provides an ideal (and probably the only possible) framework for empirical analysis of 
market power. 
For graphical analysis purposes it can be supposed that each seller has in the long run the same cost 
functions. Figure 3 illustrates the entry threshold model
33
.  
 
Figure 3 – Entry threshold model (Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)) 
It will now be analysed what happens if market demand rotates, i.e. if market size S(Y) increases. In 
the figure per firm demand level    represents the minimal level of per firm demand a single 
newspaper seller would need to break even and to enter the market (P=AC, at point 1). From the level 
of demand D1 onwards, a first firm could therefore cover its fixed costs and - potentially - enter the 
market. Although a newly entered monopolist just breaks even at price P1, it earns the substantial 
price-cost margin M1 for an additional unit (the differential between price and marginal cost). Suppose 
now that the market size S(Y) further increases. Given that S(Y) is multiplicative in the total demand 
function (where individual demand is supposed to be independent of the size of the market), total 
demand continues to rotate outwards. At a given price, the monopoly seller would therefore face more 
demand and become more and more profitable (total profit). However, the effect of rotating demand is 
twofold: It is not only increasing actual profits of the firm(s) in the market but it also increases the 
                                               
31
 This is a simplifying assumption, as composite goods sold may have some level of differentiation between 
sellers.  
32
 Both categories are fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) 
33
 Note that this graph differs from traditional market demand analysis as the X axis is reporting the per firm 
quantities and not the market quantities.  
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profits of potential entrants (it is assumed that in case of entry the market is split and all operator 
obtain the same proportional share of total demand).  
As market demand continues to rotate outwards – and so per firm demand (Figure 3) – it will 
eventually reach level D2 (or more generally DN):  the minimum per firm demand a potential second (or 
more generally N-th) entrant would need to enter and break even. When an additional firm enters it 
would be expected that the new more competitive situation would lead to declining individual margins. 
Therefore, the more demand continues to rotate outwards, the more firms will enter and the more 
individual margins decline (at entry level).  
When market demand rotates even further outwards, per firm demand grows ever larger in relation to 
minimum efficient scale (MES) and allows for more and more firms to enter. Eventually, per firm 
demand (D∞) will reach MES, where it will jointly with MC intersect AC and where margins, therefore, 
are competitive (zero). At this point, total demand may well continue to increase to infinity, but per firm 
demand would not be able to increase anymore, as a given firm which is already in the market would 
have zero profits and would make negative profits when increasing scale above MES. A new firm 
would therefore enter and produce, as all firms already in the market, at MES. D∞ therefore represents 
the maximum per firm demand.  
Given that profitability is expected to decline with each additional selling point (at entry level) it must be 
expected that entrants will require more per firm demand to enter the later they enter. In particular a 
duopolist would need a higher number of customers to enter the market than a monopolist, which 
unlike the duopolist would profit from more favourable competitive circumstances (monopoly prices).  
To conclude, in Figure 3 it can be observed that at the level of demand D1, S1 consumers pay price P1 
and the monopolist earns a price cost margin of P1-MC1. This is just enough to cover its fixed costs at 
this level of demand (minimal demand level of entry). When market demand grows further, and per 
firm demand rotates outwards, individual firms‟ margins decline at entry level as the number of firms in 
the market increases (from M1 to M3 to 0 at D ). Eventually, a competitive outcome at MES is 
observed, where margins are zero, and, being at MES, total profits are also zero.  
This analysis has considered the whole range of goods sold by newspaper sellers (composite good). 
When considering the sale of newspapers alone, the above assumptions may not be given. When 
moving, for instance, from a one to a two firm setting, at entry level the composite output per firm 
increases. Thereby, newspaper quantity discounts might also increase. At entry levels, there may 
therefore be a reduction in marginal costs related to newspapers alone with entry. At the same time, 
newspaper sellers do not have pricing flexibility and cannot adjust their prices in response to 
successive entry and competition. For the sale of newspapers alone margins at entry levels may 
therefore paradoxically increase (or remain constant) with entry (at entry level). This is, however, 
assumed not to have a substantial effect on the model, as newspapers only account for a small part of 
sales and margins of newspaper sellers. 
Formalisation 
The objective of the model is to relate the number of firms in the market N to the size of the market S 
at entry level. Therefore, as the size of the market increases (i.e. demand rotates outward), how does 
it affect entry? The consequences of entry by relating shifts (respectively rotations) in market demand 
to changes in the equilibrium number of firms can be examined. The basic concept which will be used 
to build the model is the one illustrated in Figure 3: the zero-profit conditions indicate the “entry level” 
of demand for a monopoly, a duopoly, or in general a n-oligopoly firm. 
A monopolist‟s break-even-condition is that profits (for a given size of the market) are zero. The size of 
the market which satisfies this equation gives the trigger market size for a monopolist to (potentially) 
enter the market (S1). Formally, 
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Where AVC is average variable cost. This expression is necessary as fixed costs need to be specified 
separately from variable costs in this model.  
 
  ),(),( 111 PZdWqAVCP   
is therefore the variable profit per customer (equal to the variable profit per unit times the number of 
units demanded per consumer). Now solve for the entry market size or “entry threshold” where a 
monopolist first breaks even:  
 
  1/),(),(
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111
1
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S

          (6) 
This is the market size (number of customers) needed for one firm (the first) to enter the market. The 
higher the fixed costs or the lower the variable profits per customer, the higher the minimal market size 
required for one firm, the monopolist, to enter.  
Now, assume the market size (and per firm demand) grows and firms enter as in the graphical 
illustration. Then, Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. can be generalized 
to describe the zero profit function of an N-th operator to enter the market, assuming that the market 
size is split equally among the N firms in the market: 
   0)(),(),()(  WF
N
SPZd
WqAVCPS NNNNNN  (7) 
This can be represented graphically by Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4 – Entry thresholds for a monopoly and a duopoly 
The slopes of the profit functions are the variable profits per customer in the market in the cases of 
monopoly and duopoly. Naturally, a monopolist reaches the break-even-point earlier than a duopolist 
as demand increases. The market entry threshold for a second, duopoly firm, S
D
 is always bigger than 
two times S
M
 (firm entry threshold ratio of at least unity). The reason for this is that the average 
profitability of a firm in duopoly is lower due to competition or, also, because the fixed costs of the 
second firm are higher (opportunities for instance are rare, e.g. buying adequate real estate for selling 
space etc.) or most probably because of a combination of these two factors.  
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Now the “entry threshold”, i.e. the minimal total market size necessary for N identical firms to enter 
(SN) is: 
 
  ),(),(
)(
NNN
N
PZdWqAVCP
WFN
S

  (8) 
 
The “per firm entry threshold” (or entry level of demand) sN is the minimal market size that is needed 
for each single one of the N firms to enter, i.e.
  
 
N
S
s NN   (9) 
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With increasing market demand this threshold converges to some value, i.e.   
 
N
S
s N
N 
 lim  
where 
s  is the per firm demand able to sustain any number of firms (MES). Finally, the “per firm 
entry threshold ratio” may be defined as follows 
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The per firm entry threshold ratios, which are estimated in this paper, measure the fall in variable 
profits per unit by going from a market with N firms to a market with N+1 firms when holding fixed 
costs and demand per consumer constant. Accordingly, this is a useful expression indicating how 
much variable profits decline as competition becomes more intense due to entry. It should be noted 
that this is no measure of the absolute level of profits or competition but on their development when 
moving from a market with N firms to a market with N+1 firms.  
If: 
a) Firms have the same fixed costs and 
b) Competitive conduct does not change (constant (total) variable profits) with entry 
Then, the per firm entry threshold ratio from moving from an industry with N players to an industry with 
N+1 players is 
 1/1  NN ss  (12) 
When, instead, ratios higher than one are measured, this must mean that average profitability drops 
with entry and that a new entrant would need more per firm demand than the preceding entrant to 
break even (still assuming constant fixed costs) to absorb the increase in competition. Departures of 
entry thresholds from one therefore measure how competitive conduct changes with successive entry.   
Conversely, in an already competitive equilibrium, if firms have the same fixed costs and entry does 
not change competitive conduct (profitability) anymore it can be expected that the ratio remains one. In 
this case it would take the same additional market size for a firm to enter in the market with N firms as 
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in a market with N+1 firms. As this measure cannot distinguish the levels of competition though, a per 
firm entry threshold ratio of one is compatible with both perfect competition as well as a perfect cartel. 
However, if due to entry a strong increase in competition is observed, it can only be concluded that in 
the situation preceding entry there was significant market power. The entry thresholds - for the 
mentioned reasons - are a useful scale free measure of competition. 
5. Econometric model 
The model can be transformed to allow econometric estimation of entry threshold ratios. Variable 
profits per customer in a market with N firms (VN) can be defined as: 
 
  ),(),( NNNN PZdWqAVCPV    
Therefore, 
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Market size S is supposed to be determined by a series of demand rotating variables Y   
 );( YS  (13)
 
Where  is a parameter vector. Suppose now that average variable profitability VN in a market with N 
firms decreases with the number of firms in the market and increases with demand shifting variables 
(e.g. income per capita). The following additive setting will be used, where α parameters are expected 
to be positive and decreasing with the number of firms, i.e. αN should be smaller the bigger N.  
 
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1),,,(   (14)  
Z represents demand shifters and W (average variable) costs shifters, which are both included in X.  
Suppose further that fixed costs F are allowed to be increasing with the number of firms (Equation 15). 
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This would account for the fact that later entrants may have higher fixed costs, for example because 
opportunities are rare. Therefore, it can be expected that γ’s are positive, but decrease with N. Finally, 
fixed cost shifters W are included (e.g. real estate prices or availability). For estimation purposes, total 
profits in a market with N firms can be expressed as 
   ),(),,,(),( WFWZVYS NNNN  (16)  
where N  is the latent variable and , the error term, is assumed to be the profit which cannot be 
observed. This setting allows for a probit estimation in the next section. The error term is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution, to be independent and to be identically distributed across the markets. 
Moreover, the term is assumed to have mean zero and variance one throughout. The estimation 
framework described in the next chapter will allow for prediction of the number of firms in the market.  
Estimation procedure 
The entry decision of a firm depends on whether an additional firm can earn positive profits. But also 
the entry decision of the firm that had entered previously to the new entrant will need to be taken into 
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account. If this firm is in the market, it must mean that it earns positive profits. Formally, if profits of the 
first firm are negative, no entry is possible. If such profits are positive, a firm can enter. Profits in 
monopoly, however, have to be lower than those necessary to sustain two firms, as otherwise two 
firms would enter. Therefore, when considering only three states (zero, one or two firms): 
)(1)Pr(1)Pr()Pr()0Pr()0Pr()0Pr( 111111  N
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  andandandN
)()Pr()Pr()0Pr()2Pr( 2222  N              (17) 
The above formalised model explains entry by the level of profit in the market. It can, however, not be 
estimated by a standard regression which would treat the difference between category 0 and 1 in the 
same way as the difference between category 1 and 2, whereas in fact these differences correspond 
only to a ranking. The model must therefore be estimated by a model capable to handle discrete 
ordered choice dependent variables (Maddala, 1983). The model refers to the cumulative normal 
distribution function (associated to the probit regression). Ordered probit is a common specification for 
ordinal response models. The model is estimated using standard maximum likelihood procedure. The 
maximum likelihood can be written as follows 
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where ()  is the inverse normal cumulative function, when, as assumed, the single probabilities are 
independent. The likelihood of the observed outcome is therefore maximised by maximising the 
product of probabilities for each state. )(1 jnm   is equal to 1 if in market m a number of j firms is 
found and zero otherwise. Maximising a product is equivalent to maximising the logs of it, i.e.  
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This function can now be maximised with respect to the parameters. The particular challenge of the 
econometric model with respect to usual ordinal response models is that it is nonlinear.   
6. Data on Swiss communes 
When defining from a geographical point of view local newspaper selling markets in Switzerland, it 
may be reasonable to define it to extend to the communal territory (as in Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1991)). In many cases, in rural areas, a large part of the commune can be reached within a 
reasonable walking distance. Between two neighbouring rural communes, there is typically a more or 
less extended area of relatively low population density, which may constitute an obstacle to cross-
commune demand. Observations can therefore be considered sufficiently independent, especially in 
rural areas which constitute the areas of greatest interest. The data summarized in Table 1 is used for 
estimation. 
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Variable Name in 
dataset 
Unit Definition Source N Mean 
(abs) 
Std. dev. 
(abs) 
  blick  Number of newspaper 
selling points (Blick) in 
each commune, 2004 
Ringer/ 
Blick 
1667 3.83 15.7641 
 
Market size  
 
   
   pop 000s Permanent residential 
population, 2002 
BFS 1667 3.11 10.89 
   CommutersIN 000s Number of commuters 
into the commune, 2004 
BFS 1623 1.13 6.82 
 
Representative customer demand shifters 
 
   
   inc 
 
kCHF Average taxable income 
per commune, 1998 
ESTV 1646 60.78 10.9 
   old 
 
000s Residential population 
having over 65 years 
per commune, 2004 
BFS 1666 0.15 0.04 
   foreigners 000s Foreign residential 
population, 2002 
BFS 1652 0.10 0.08 
   edu 000s Average number of 
schooling years per 
commune, 2004 
BFS 1658 11.53 0.60 
 
Fixed cost shifters 
 
   
  farmlpc CHF 
(100= 
1/2000) 
Area used for 
agriculture per capita for 
each commune,  1997 
BFS 1667 0.86 2.19 
Table 1 – Dataset used to estimate entry threshold ratios for Swiss newspaper sellers 
The number of newspaper selling points in Swiss communes in the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland is analysed in this paper. This number is measured by the number of sellers which sell the 
national daily “Blick”, which is one of the papers sold virtually in all distribution points in the German-
speaking part of the country. It can be supposed that selling points which are selling this newspaper 
would also sell the relevant local newspapers of the regions in which they are active. It is therefore 
assumed to be a good approximation of the total number of newspaper sellers.  
Figure 5 shows the frequency distribution for communes, by the number of sellers. 
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Figure 5 – Number of newspaper sellers in Swiss communes (frequency distribution)
34
  
The number of observations corresponds to the total number of communes in the German-speaking 
part of Switzerland
35
. Many communes do not seem have a newspaper selling point (27%). All other 
communes have one or more selling points. Moreover, the case of more than four sellers in a 
commune is relatively rare. There are, however, eleven outlier observations (Zurich for example is 
having 515 selling points). Also, as can be seen from  Figure 6 the large majority of communities have 
a population below 1‟000. 
 
Figure 6 – Population in Swiss communes, frequency distribution
36
 
                                               
34
 STATA input: “hist blick if pop<40000 & pop!=0” 
35
 Except for the communes in the Canton of Thurgau, which were omitted, because there were changes in the 
geographic definition of communes over the years under consideration. 
36
 STATA command: dotplot pop if pop<40000 & pop!=0 
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The model builds on the idea that population is one determinant of the relevant market size for 
newspaper sellers and that market size, in turn, influences the number of entrants. Residential 
population and inbound commuters to the commune are used as indicators for the size of the market a 
seller can potentially address in the commune
37
. Moreover, income is used as a demand shifting 
variable in the model. In addition, as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) demographic variables are used 
to control for possible differences between communes (population over 65 years, foreigners). Finally, 
the average schooling years are introduced as a control, as education levels may have an effect on 
demand for newspapers. Finally, it is proposed to include the farmland area per capita in the 
commune as an indicator for low real estate prices and, therefore as an adequate fixed cost shifter in a 
commune.  
7. Estimation and interpretation of 
results 
In this chapter , a model is fitted to calculate entry thresholds, per firm entry thresholds and per firm 
entry threshold ratios. Then, tests to verify the validity of results are performed and results are 
interpreted. Practically speaking, estimating Equation 19 is a complex task, which needs to be 
performed by designing a dedicated nonlinear ordered probit optimization algorithm (see annex) as 
well as test algorithms. Different similar algorithms have inspired this design, in particular Youle (2012) 
and Evdokimov (2013). 
The regression results are reported in Table 2. 
 Coefficient 
estimate 
Std. 
err.  
P>¦z ¦ 
   (pop) 1 (set) - - 
    commuterIN) .7810 .2173 0.000 
    inc) -.0028 .0014 0.050  
    (old) 1.494 .3138 0.000 
    (foreigners) .5744 .1913 0.003 
    (edu) -.0353 .0318 0.266 
       1.249 .3200 0.014 
          .1652 .0673 0.020 
          .1862 .0375 0.000 
          .1103 .0245 0.000 
          .1062 .0187 0.000 
       .4920 .0758 0.000 
          .9882 .0818 0.000 
          .3590 .0645 0.000 
          .2120 .0597 0.000 
          .0946 .0496 0.057 
   -.0385 .0178 0.031 
Prob> χ
2
 0.000   
N 1596   
 
Table 2 – Nonlinear ordered probit estimates 
As in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), the coefficient on population was set equal to one (i.e. market size 
expressed in terms of residential population). Most coefficients are as expected and significant at 10%.  
Prob(          indicates that the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero can be 
                                               
37
 It is abstracted here from outward commuters.  
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rejected and therefore the model as a whole is significant as well. The following basic equations were 
implicitly estimated with the ordered probit model.  
                        (20) 
where    is population and    is inbound commuters. 
                        
 
     (21) 
where the W variable is the available agricultural land per capita in the commune, and  
                    
 
    (22)  
where the X variables include income in the commune and socio-demographic variables such as the 
number of aged people in the commune, the average number of schooling years and foreign resident 
population. As described before, it is expected that all   and  ‟s are positive in order to ensure 
decreasing average profits and increasing fixed cost with successive entry. This is the case for all 10 
affected   and   coefficients and they are all significant at 10%38.  
As described before, CommuntersIN is the number of people commuting to the commune under 
observation. Such commuters seem to have a significant and only slightly less strong importance in 
determining the relevant market size with respect to residential population (set to 1 for normalisation 
reasons). In this case, one resident of the commune counts as 1 in the market size considered by the 
newspaper seller. The commuters to the commune count as 0.78. Thus, the market size of a given 
commune can be calculated using the formula: 
                                  (23) 
This is important, as all subsequent analysis referring to the “market size” of a commune refer to this 
value for a given commune, not its population.  
Income in the commune does not seem to be, as could be expected at first, a positive but a negative 
demand driver. This seems, however, reasonable as many goods typically sold by newspaper sellers 
are inferior goods (e.g. cold packaged sandwiches, tobacco, lottery, etc.). It is therefore possible that, 
in richer communes, people are less likely to visit such sellers and may prefer more specialised 
suppliers. In addition, it can also be expected that in such communes subscribership for newspapers is 
higher and demand at selling points is consequently lower.   
The amount of elderly people in a commune seems to have a strong and significantly positive effect 
on the variable profits of newspaper sellers in a commune. This might reflect the fact that retired 
people have more time to visit such retailers. Also, the size of the foreign residential population 
seems to have a significant positive effect on newspaper sellers‟ profitability and entry. It is possible 
that this population segment (contrary to rich people) has higher demand for goods sold at typical 
newspaper selling points. Moreover, the number of average schooling years in a commune has an 
insignificant effect on newspaper sellers‟ overall profitability. Finally, the area used for agriculture per 
capita is having the expected significant and opposite effect to land prices for which it is used as a 
proxy.  
What is of particular interest in this article is, however, not the detailed demand or cost effects for 
products sold by firms selling newspapers, as these concern a largely undefined set. The focus of this 
article is on competitive effects of entry which are analysed in the next section.  
                                               
38
 The circumstance that   is not significant at 5% is unproblematic for the model. A late entrant might well once 
not have significantly higher fixed costs than the preceding entrant.  
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Entry threshold estimation 
The entry thresholds or minimum market sizes for an N-th firm to enter the Swiss newspaper sellers‟ 
market can be calculated using Equation 8, the ordered probit coefficient estimates and the mean 
values of the variables
39
. Results are reported in Table 3 and Figure 7. In theory, calculating the entry 
threshold might imply using state-dependent mean of the variables. It is, however, shown that in 
practice differences in results are negligible (these values are reported in the second rows of the table 
and are denoted by S* (red in the figure) instead of S (blue in the figure)).  
 
Table 3, Figure 7 - Entry thresholds in terms of population
40
, allowing an N-th firm to break even 
Market size values are expressed here in terms of population (potential customers), but are referring 
to commune market size and therefore not only residential population. For example Table 3 indicates 
that a newspaper selling monopolist may enter at a market size of 482 (in terms of population), the 
second firm at market size 1‟841 etc. Whether a given commune is below or above this threshold is 
calculated using Equation 23. For instance, when verifying whether entry of a first newspaper seller is 
economically sustainable in the town of Luchsingen, one would have to consider its population (938) 
as well as its inbound commuters (127). In total, this town would represent a market size of 1‟037 (938 
+ 0.78*127). As the first entry threshold is 482 and the second is 1‟841, it would be concluded that 
entry of one seller in this commune is economically viable, but that competition, i.e. the entrance of a 
second seller, is not. This conclusion is independent of the real situation in the single commune 
(whether entry has actually taken place or not), which may also be different. It can be noted here that 
using state-dependent means
41
 reduces the entry threshold for the 5
th
 (or more) firm but does not 
otherwise lead to significantly different results.  
Per firm entry thresholds 
The per firm entry thresholds can be calculated using Equation 9 on the basis of the entry thresholds 
reported in Table 4.  Per firm entry thresholds are reported in Table 4 and Figure 8.  
                                               
39
 The STATA algorithm is programmed to calculate entry thresholds directly.  
40
 While everything is expressed in terms of population, when checking whether a commune is affected or not by 
these rules, commuters need to be added to population.  
41
 This would imply, for example, that for the calculation of the estimates of variable profits (Equation 22) for each 
state (i.e. from zero to five entrants) the X values considered are not the overall sample means but the sample 
means applying to each state of the variable.  
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Newspaper retailers, S 482 1'841 3'012 4'123 5'512 
Newspaper retailers (state 
dep. sample means), S* 
490 1'864 3'066 4'154 5'156 
0 
1'000 
2'000 
3'000 
4'000 
5'000 
6'000 
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Table 4, Figure 8 - Per firm entry thresholds in terms of population 
It can be seen that per firm entry thresholds increase with entry as expected and settle around a per 
firm market size of 1‟000 (in terms of population). It can be seen that the per firm entry threshold for a 
second firm to enter is nearly double the entry threshold for a monopolist. Competition therefore 
seems to strongly increase with the entry of a second firm. This result can be stated more clearly in 
the analysis of per firm entry threshold ratios.  
Per firm entry threshold ratios 
The per firm entry threshold ratios can be calculated using Equation 11 on the basis of the per firm 
entry thresholds reported in Table 4. Per firm entry threshold ratios are reported in Table 5 and Figure 
9. 
 
Table 5, Figure 9 - Per firm entry threshold ratios 
The per firm entry threshold ratios behave as expected and approach one the more firms enter 
(meaning competition is not affected anymore by further entry). What must be noted here is that the 
first per firm threshold ratio       is significantly higher than subsequent ratios. This seems to indicate 
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 
Newspaper retailers, s 482 921 1'004 1'031 1'102 
Newspaper retailers (state 
dep. sample means), s* 
490 932 1'022 1'039 1'031 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1'000 
1'200 
s2/s1 s3/s2 s4/s3 s5/s4 
Newspaper retailers, S 1.91 1.09 1.03 1.07 
Newspaper retailers (state 
dep. sample means), S* 
1.90 1.10 1.02 0.99 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
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that there is a strong increase in competition when the second seller enters. A slight increase in 
competition may be observed with the third seller, while entry of the fourth or further firms does not 
seem to further increase competition. It should be noted that when using full sample means       is 
higher than the preceding threshold ratio. This should not be that case as this implies a slight 
reduction of competition with further entry. While this is theoretically possible it is unlikely in practice. 
The value of       is, however, slightly different and in line with theory when using state-dependent 
means. It can therefore be expected that this effect is created by some outliers (larger cities) which are 
included in category 5. Using state-dependent means, such outliers may be addressed more 
appropriately.  
Equality tests for per firm entry thresholds 
In order to ensure that the conclusions on per firm entry threshold ratios and competition are correct a 
Wald test for threshold proportionality can be performed (The per firm entry threshold ratios can be 
calculated using Equation 11 on the basis of the per firm entry thresholds reported in Table 4. Per firm 
entry threshold ratios are reported in Table 5 and Figure 9. 
). The algorithm is reported in the annex.  
                                          
χ
2
 (1) = 0.08 
P > χ
2
= 0.77 
χ
2
 (2)= 0.21 
P  > χ
2
 =   0.90 
χ
2
 (3)=1.42 
P > χ
2
 = 0.70 
χ
2
 (4)=35.32** 
P > χ
2
 =0.00 
Table 6 – Wald tests for equality of per firm entry thresholds 
Formally, the test results show that the hypothesis             cannot be rejected. Conversely, it 
can be concluded that                can be rejected.  
The test results show that there is no significant difference between the per firm entry thresholds when 
moving from a duopoly to a three, a four or a five firm market environment. In other words, firm do not 
require substantially more customers to enter than in an environment with fewer competitors. 
Unsurprisingly, the test confirms that the contrary is true when moving from a monopoly to a duopoly 
environment, where, as shown before, the market size necessary for entry of a duopolist to enter is 
much higher than the size necessary for the monopolist to enter.   
The results imply equally that the hypothesis that each entry thresholds ratio pair is equal to 1 can be 
rejected except for the first pair. Again, this is not surprising as our graphical analysis shows that there 
is a strong decrease in per firm entry threshold ratios when the second firm enters (     ), but not 
afterwards. When interpreting the right hand side of Equation 11 it can be concluded that when holding 
fixed costs constant, variable profits remain the same when moving from a two to a three, four or five 
(or more) firm environment, but not when moving from a one to a two firm environment. The test 
therefore indicates that there is a significant increase in competition with entry of the second firm, but 
none for subsequent entry. In other words, it seems that in the newspaper sellers‟ market two firms in 
a commune are sufficient to ensure competition.  
Benchmarking results 
It can be useful to compare these results to values found by other authors. While no other study has 
tried to estimate entry threshold ratios in the market for newspaper sellers, these results may be 
compared to results in other markets. Most importantly, the above results
42
 can be compared to the 
values found by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) for tire dealers, dentists, druggists and plumbers and to 
Abraham, Gaynor and Vogt (2007) for hospitals (Figure 10). 
                                               
42
 Using state-dependent means 
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Figure 10  - Per firm entry threshold ratios for Swiss newspaper sellers in comparison 
It can be seen that the estimates made in this article are well within the bounds of other estimates of 
per firm entry threshold ratios. Interestingly, Bresnahan and Reiss‟ (1991) estimates for U.S. doctors 
are virtually the same as those for Swiss newspapers. Entry effects on competition in these two 
markets can therefore be expected to be identical. Other results may also be stated here as the model 
has been applied by other authors in recent years. Most importantly, Abraham, Gaynor and Vogt 
(2007) study the entry of hospitals in U.S. cities. They find entry threshold ratios of 1.97, 1.44 and 1.06 
meaning that competition is driven mostly by the entry of a second and third hospital (a development 
of competition with entry similar to druggists in Figure 10). Their results are used to conclude that 
blocking hospital mergers implying moving from three to two firms or from two to one in a local market 
(as contextually proposed by the U.S. antitrust authorities but rejected by the Court) may likely cause 
significant harm to competition and consumers.   
The estimate for the first entry threshold ratio in the Swiss newspaper sellers‟ market is high at 1.9 (i.e. 
the second entrant needs 90% higher per firm demand to enter than the first entrant). However, 
Abraham, Gaynor and Vogt (2007) and Bresnahan and Reiss‟ (1991) estimates of other markets - with 
the exception of plumbers - seem to be similarly high. It seems therefore that it is common that the 
second entrant importantly increases competition in the market. For subsequent entry, the situation is 
less clear and depends on the market. From a qualitative point of view, newspaper sellers can likely 
be best compared to (other) retail markets. For instance, a comparison with plumbers which usually 
sell services and may be more location independent may be less adequate. Also, entrance in the 
doctor or dentist markets can be expected to be highly regulated, which makes comparisons difficult. 
Results may, however, be well compared to tire dealers and druggists, both location based retailers. 
Most importantly, this comparison shows that while market power seems to decline relatively gradually 
with entry of the second and third firms for druggists
43
 and tire dealers, this is not the case for Swiss 
newspaper sellers. The conclusion that two firms in a commune may be sufficient to ensure 
competition - or as the Dutch regulatory authority for telecommunications states “two are enough” 
(OPTA (2006)) - may therefore not apply in other retail markets.  
Coverage 
As has been shown before, the overall profitability of newspaper sellers strongly declines in the case 
of entry of a second newspaper seller in a commune. In what follows, the results in terms of coverage 
will be analysed.  
                                               
43
 It should be noted that in the U.S. druggists usually also sell newspapers. 
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If a monopolist in a small commune would earn only the variable profits a duopolist would earn, i.e. if it 
would behave as competitively as a duopolist, it would only enter in communes with more than 921 
potential customers (duopoly entry level demand). This means that the additional margin extracted by 
a monopoly newspaper seller on the whole range of its products allows communes with a market size 
below 921, but above 482 (the entry level the monopolist needs to enter) to have a single selling point 
instead of having none. In Switzerland, concretely, according to the above, entry for newspaper sellers 
is possible for a first monopoly firm (with monopoly competitive conduct) only with a minimum of 482 
potential customers. 310 (out of about 2‟700) Swiss communes exist, where, for their market size, 
entry is in no case viable even for a monopoly applying monopoly prices. About 80‟000 people are 
living in such (very small) communes, corresponding to about 1% of the Swiss residential population. 
In case the first entrant would only earn duopoly profits, it would only enter at a minimal market size of 
921. In such case 263 additional communes, inhabited by 164‟000 people or 2,1% of the population, 
would not be able to sustain a selling point. Thanks to the higher variable profits that monopolies can 
earn in the free market, a newspapers selling point in these communes is sustainable, and coverage 
can be extended by 2,1% of the population.  
While less competition may increase prices and lower static welfare, our model shows that it may also 
lead to an important and clearly quantifiable effect on sustainable total coverage (dynamic welfare), 
which also needs to be taken into account in case of any public policy intervention (competition-
coverage trade-off). From a welfare point of view, in a marginal area which would not be served under 
more competitive conduct by monopolists, monopolistic pricing would increase welfare. At the same 
time, such a pricing policy may decrease static welfare in other (monopoly) areas. Considering the 
overall effects, it is unclear which situation would be socially optimal (monopoly or duopoly prices in 
monopoly areas). Such a trade-off also arises, for instance, in the telecommunications industry, where 
a regulator has to set access prices in monopoly and duopoly areas to ensure not only local 
competition but also sufficient investment incentives for coverage (see Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig 
(2012)). When considering only press products, where margins are independent of entry or even 
increasing with entry, a situation with monopoly conduct of newspaper sellers (over a whole range 
over products) in monopoly areas would likely be socially preferred. It should be noted, however, that 
the social benefit of coverage for press products may then come at the cost of, for instance, higher 
food or fuel prices at newspaper selling points. In terms of total coverage with press products only, it is 
beneficial that a monopolist earns relatively high margins. Similarly, though, it is optimal in terms of 
welfare that these margins decline strongly with a second entrant, as coverage is already ensured and 
there is little potential for differentiation in distribution in this model. 
The model proposed also has some limitations. Firstly, consumers‟ travel costs are not addressed. 
Typically, the consideration of such costs would argue for increased industry demand with successive 
entry. At the same time the assumption of fully independent demand between communes may not be 
given as markets may overlap. Further empirical research is necessary to address these issues.  
8. Policy Recommendations 
Depending upon the priorities of legislators different public actions are appropriate in the single copy 
newspaper distribution market. Coverage of the country with selling points is not only important for 
citizens to inform themselves, but also for potential new newspaper entrants (editors) to reach (new) 
customers efficiently. There could therefore be reasons to think that the presence of the first seller in a 
local market has positive externalities for the economy and therefore should be supported. 
Direct public intervention in the market 
One way to ensure the availability of newspapers in local market is by direct public intervention. The 
government could instruct the Swiss Post to sell local newspapers (again) in some post offices, and, if 
necessary, to reduce other free market product sales. To maximize welfare access to the Post‟s sales 
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infrastructure for publishers, wholesale distributors could also be granted access at regulated terms. 
As in telecommunications, though, a market intervention would likely only be justified in case of 
absence of (viable) competition. Otherwise, there is no need to enhance competition (and coverage) 
and any intervention would only distort competition. Absence of competition is at least given where in 
local markets entry of a newspaper seller is not viable. Our estimations show that this is the case in 
the 310 communes with a market size of less than 482. When looking at the actual data from the 
market, it can be seen that 405 communes inhabited by 210‟000 or 2,7% of population are not served 
by a selling point in practice. Our model indicates, however, that in 95 more communes (covering 
about 130‟000 inhabitants or 1,6% of population) entry would be economically sustainable.  
The Swiss Post has intermittently sold newspapers in post offices. In 2007, it planned to offer 
newspapers in 470 post offices in the German-speaking part of Switzerland (out of about 2‟600 in the 
whole country). Table 7 lists post offices where in 2007 selling points were set up (a full list was not 
published): 
  No 
potential 
entrant 
 
One 
potential 
entrant 
Two 
potential 
entrants 
Three 
potential 
entrants 
Four 
potential 
entrants 
Five or more  
potential 
entrants 
Trial post offices 
in 2007
44
 
Estimatio
n of S 
 
S<482 
482<S< 
1841 
1841<S< 
3011 
3011<S< 
4123 
4123<S< 
5512 
 
S>5512 
Aarau 1 32„519      X 
Altdorf (UR) 1 11„918      X 
Baden 1 31„650      X 
Bern 1 203„368      X 
Bern 14 203„368      X 
Bern 18 203„368      X 
Breitenbach (SO) 4„602     X  
Chur 4 41„540      X 
Davos Platz 1 11„577      X 
Domat/Ems 7„743      X 
Grenchen 1 2„271   X    
Kreuzlingen 1 21„240      X 
Landquart 8„719      X 
Laufen 7„275      X 
Luzern 1 87„718      X 
Reinach 1 24„120      X 
Romanshorn 1 11„896      X 
Solothurn 2 27„711      X 
Sulgen 4„358     X  
Winterthur 1 11„2819      X 
Zug 1 39„017      X 
Zürich 21 Sihlpost 510„052      X 
Zürich 27 Enge 510„052      X 
Zürich 47 510„052      X 
Table 7 – Areas with post offices where selling newspapers; planned (Source: Swiss Post) 
From the previous analysis, it is clear that, when in a commune no entrant is economically sustainable, 
public competition would only slightly distort the market by decreasing the potential profit of the 
following entrant, which is, however, unlikely to ever enter the market.  
When analyzing entry in a market where one firm can be active, these considerations change. Firstly, 
there is a potential or even actual alternative firm. By entering this market, the Swiss Post would 
                                               
44
 Source: Swiss Post 
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(following the assumptions in our analysis) get half of the market in the event that an actual competitor 
is present, and the full market when, even though potential entry is possible, in reality there is no firm 
present. In the first situation, the Swiss Post enters directly in competition with private firms on the free 
market. Such an intervention should only be conducted when there are potential benefits. In this case 
the only possible justification for such an intervention could be that a single seller cannot ensure 
sufficient competition, and that a public firm must enter to safeguard competition. Considering the 
results of this paper, this is likely to be only the case in a one firm market. In the second situation, the 
Post takes the place of a competitor which could otherwise have been a private firm. Finally, when two 
or more entrants are potentially possible, it can be seen that the competitive situation is vastly 
improved. In such case neither reason of coverage nor of competition could justify a market 
intervention by the government, as it is likely that the market is already competitive. From the list of 
trial post offices, it can be seen that all selling points were set up in communes where multiple selling 
points are economically viable. However, no plans for this business have been made in small 
communes, where typically no private firm could enter, but where post offices are available, or where 
only one firm is present. In light of earlier results such public policy seems therefore distortive of 
competition and is - under the assumptions made in this paper - unnecessary to increase coverage or 
competition.  
Subsidies 
In addition to direct market intervention public policy consisted and still consists in subsidizing small 
local editors by reducing the postal service prices they pay in order to reach their subscribers. If 
national coverage with newspaper sellers were seen as a priority, then such subsidization could be 
extended to early delivery for both subscriptions and for newspaper sellers‟ supply. Such 
reimbursement should occur independently of the delivery operator (today this includes only delivery 
by the Swiss Post to newspaper subscribers, and excludes early delivery).  
Overall price levels 
In January 2013, a survey by Swiss consumer organisations showed that international journals are 
sold at high prices at Swiss newspaper selling points. In particular, the study showed that journal and 
magazine prices were 58% higher when bought at a Swiss newspaper selling point rather than at a 
German newspaper selling point (e.g. magazines like “GEO” or “Spiegel”)
45
. Comparison with France 
shows a similar difference of 59%. Among Italian newspapers popular in the Italian-speaking part of 
Switzerland, the difference was even 107%. The emphasis on this subject in public debate could put 
legislators and the competition authority under pressure to act in order to reduce final prices.  
If institutions would want to increase price competition for newspapers at the retail level, price flexibility 
could be enforced. In areas in which there is more than one seller, competition between sellers on final 
prices might be enhanced. Conversely, under the assumptions of the model (newspaper sales are 
only a small proportion of total sales and margins), coverage of newspaper selling points would not be 
affected by this measure. In addition, the price difference with neighbouring countries might rather hint 
at competitive problems in the wholesale market (Valora). In the case of dominance, possible 
interventions include interventions based on competition law or direct market interventions in the 
wholesale market by the Swiss Post. 
9. Conclusions 
This paper estimates competitive effects of entry in the Swiss newspaper sellers market as well as 
coverage following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). A market is considered where such sellers sell 
composite products including a broad range of other products such as food and near-food for which 
largely free price-setting on retail level is possible. The methodology adopted allows estimation without 
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necessitating price and quantity data, therefore being useful for application in markets where data is 
rare and the range of products under examination not entirely clear. 
It is found that a monopoly seller can enter communes with market size above 482 and two duopoly 
sellers can enter when the market size is above 1‟841. All N-oligopolies would need each about 1‟000 
potential additional customers to enter. Entry is shown to be unviable in communes corresponding to 
1% of the Swiss residential population, while entry in an additional 2.1% is shown to be only viable 
when monopolies are able to freely set monopoly prices on the range of products sold. There is 
therefore a clearly quantifiable trade-off between market prices and total coverage (investment).  
The model additionally shows that competition increases strongly with the entry of a second 
newspaper seller in the market, while further firms cannot add significant further competitive pressure. 
It is therefore concluded that in the Swiss newspaper sellers‟ market, two firms are enough to ensure 
competition. Related articles have used such results to conclude that proposed mergers between 
firms, reducing firms in the market to not less than two, would not reduce competition or harm 
consumers. The results of this paper are, however, also compared to other retail markets and it is 
found that these conclusions may not be valid, for instance, for tire dealers or druggists, where also a 
third entrant may significantly enhance competition.  
Finally, current public policy in this field is assessed and it is found, that the past local entry of 
government controlled Swiss Post in the newspaper sellers‟ market would have concerned only areas 
where the model predicts that viable competition between two or more sellers is sustainable. Such 
public policy is judged negatively, as it can neither enhance competition significantly nor extend 
coverage, but risks distorting competition. Nevertheless, it is shown that there are 310 communes 
where such a policy would not distort competition and could enhance welfare.  
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Annex: STATA12 algorithms to produce 
regression results, estimates and tests 
 
STATA “.do” file to produce Table 2: 
 
set more off 
capture program drop nloprobit 
program nloprobit 
   args lnf S V1 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 F1 
   tempvar P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
   qui gen double `P1'=normal(`S'*(`V1'+`a1')-`F1'-`g1') 
   qui gen double `P2'=normal(`S'*(`V1'+`a1'-`a2')-`F1'-`g1'-`g2') 
   qui gen double `P3'=normal(`S'*(`V1'+`a1'-`a2'-`a3')-`F1'-`g1'-`g2'-`g3') 
   qui gen double `P4'=normal(`S'*(`V1'+`a1'-`a2'-`a3'-`a4')-`F1'-`g1'-`g2'-`g3'-`g4') 
   qui gen double `P5'=normal(`S'*(`V1'+`a1'-`a2'-`a3'-`a4'-`a5')-`F1'-`g1'-`g2'-`g3'-`g4'-`g5') 
   qui replace `lnf'=ln(1-`P1') if $ML_y1==0 
   qui replace `lnf'=ln(`P1'-`P2') if $ML_y1==1 
   qui replace `lnf'=ln(`P2'-`P3') if $ML_y1==2 
   qui replace `lnf'=ln(`P3'-`P4') if $ML_y1==3 
   qui replace `lnf'=ln(`P4'-`P5') if $ML_y1==4 
   qui replace `lnf'=ln(`P5') if $ML_y1>=5 
end 
 
ml model lf nloprobit (lambda:  commuterIN, nocons offset(pop)) /// 
                      (beta:  inc old foreigners edu, nocons) /// 
                      /alpha1 /alpha2 /alpha3 /alpha4 /alpha5 /// 
                      /gamma1 /gamma2 /gamma3 /gamma4 /gamma5 /// 
                      (gammaL:blick=farmlpc, nocons) 
 
ml search lambda 0 50 beta 0 1 alpha1 0 1 alpha2 0 1 alpha3 0 1 alpha4 0 1 alpha5 0 1 /// 
                    gamma1 0 1 gamma2 0 1 gamma3 0 1 gamma4 0 1 gamma5 0 1 gammaL 0 1 
ml check 
ml query 
ml maximize, difficult 
 
/*drop S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 s_1 s_2 s_3 s_4 s_5 s_21 s_32 s_43 s_54 betas ffracm lnhddm pincm eldm landvm*/ 
/*dist10kcity rent*/ 
 
qui egen incm=mean(inc) 
qui egen oldm=mean(old) 
qui egen edum=mean(edu) 
qui egen foreignersm=mean(foreigners) 
qui egen dist10kcitym=mean(dist10kcity) 
qui egen rentm=mean(rent) 
qui egen farmlpcm=mean(farmlpc) 
 
qui gen betas=_b[beta:inc]*incm+_b[beta:old]*oldm+_b[beta:edu]*edum+_b[beta:foreigners]*foreignersm 
qui gen 
S5=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*f
armlpcm]/[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alpha5]_cons+betas] 
qui gen 
S4=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[[alpha
1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas] 
qui gen S3=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons+betas] 
qui gen S2=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons+betas] 
qui gen S1=[[gamma1]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[[alpha1]_cons+betas] 
 
qui gen s_5=S5/5 
qui gen s_4=S4/4 
qui gen s_3=S3/3 
qui gen s_2=S2/2 
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qui gen s_1=S1/1 
 
qui gen s_54=s_5/s_4 
qui gen s_43=s_4/s_3 
qui gen s_32=s_3/s_2 
qui gen s_21=s_2/s_1 
 
display " S1  " S1  _newline " S2  " S2  _newline " S3  " S3  _newline " S4  " S4  _newline " S5  " S5 _newline 
_newline  " s1  " s_1  _newline " s2  " s_2  _newline " s3  " s_3  _newline " s4  " s_4  _newline " s5  " s_5 _newline 
_newline  " s21  " s_21  _newline " s32  " s_32  _newline " s43  " s_43  _newline " s54  " s_54 
 
Generation of estimates using state-dependent sample means (use after first .do file): 
. qui gen betas1=_b[beta:inc]*incm1+_b[beta:old]*oldm1+_b[beta:edu]*edum1+_b[beta:foreigners]*foreignersm1 
. qui gen betas2=_b[beta:inc]*incm2+_b[beta:old]*oldm2+_b[beta:edu]*edum2+_b[beta:foreigners]*foreignersm2 
. qui gen betas3=_b[beta:inc]*incm3+_b[beta:old]*oldm3+_b[beta:edu]*edum3+_b[beta:foreigners]*foreignersm3 
. qui gen betas4=_b[beta:inc]*incm4+_b[beta:old]*oldm4+_b[beta:edu]*edum4+_b[beta:foreigners]*foreignersm4 
. qui gen betas5=_b[beta:inc]*incm5+_b[beta:old]*oldm5+_b[beta:edu]*edum5+_b[beta:foreigners]*foreignersm5 
. qui gen 
S5new=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b[gammaL:farml
pc]*farmlpcm5]/[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alpha5]_cons+betas5 
> ] 
. qui gen 
S4new=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm4]/[[
alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas4] 
. qui gen 
S3new=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm3]/[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons+betas3] 
. qui gen S2new=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm2]/[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons+betas2] 
. qui gen S1new=[[gamma1]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm1]/[[alpha1]_cons+betas1] 
. qui gen s_5new=S5new/5 
. qui gen s_4new=S4new/4 
. qui gen s_3new=S3new/3 
. qui gen s_2new=S2new/2 
. qui gen s_1new=S1new/1 
. qui gen s_54new=s_5new/s_4new 
. qui gen s_43new=s_4new/s_3new 
. qui gen s_32new=s_3new/s_2new 
. qui gen s_21new=s_2new/s_1new 
. display " S1  " S1new  _newline " S2  " S2new  _newline " S3  " S3new  _newline " S4  " S4new  _newline " S5  " 
S5new _newline _newline  " s1  " s_1new  _newline " s2  " s_2new  _newline " s3  
>  " s_3new  _newline " s4  " s_4new  _newline " s5  " s_5new _newline _newline  " s21  " s_21new  _newline " 
s32  " s_32new  _newline " s43  " s_43new  _newline " s54  " s_54new 
 
STATA “.do” file to produce tests 
 
. testnl ([ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alp 
> ha5] _cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]]) 
>        ([[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons- 
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_ 
> cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b [gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-
[alpha3]_cons+betas]])   ([[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL 
> :farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons- 
[alpha3]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1] _cons-
[alpha2]_cons+betas]]) 
>     ([[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[1*[[alpha1] _cons+betas]] 
> ) 
 
  (1)  [ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alpha5 
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> ] _cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]] 
  (2)  [[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons- 
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_c 
> ons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b [gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-
[alpha3]_cons+betas]] 
  (3)  [[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons- [alpha3]_cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL: 
> farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1] _cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]] 
  (4)  [[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]] 
= [[gamma1]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[1*[[alpha1] _cons+betas 
> ]] 
 
               chi2(4) =       35.32 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0000 
 
. testnl ([ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alp 
> ha5] _cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]]) 
>        ([[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons- 
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_ 
> cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b [gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-
[alpha3]_cons+betas]])   ([[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL 
> :farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons- 
[alpha3]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1] _cons-
[alpha2]_cons+betas]]) 
 
  (1)  [ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alpha5 
> ] _cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]] 
  (2)  [[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons- 
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_c 
> ons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b [gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-
[alpha3]_cons+betas]] 
  (3)  [[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons- [alpha3]_cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL: 
> farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1] _cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]] 
 
               chi2(3) =        1.42 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.7013 
 
. testnl ([ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alp 
> ha5] _cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]]) 
>        ([[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons- 
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_ 
> cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b [gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-
[alpha3]_cons+betas]]) 
 
  (1)  [ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alpha5 
> ] _cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]] 
  (2)  [[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons- 
[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_c 
> ons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b [gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-
[alpha3]_cons+betas]] 
 
               chi2(2) =        0.21 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.8984 
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. testnl ([ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alp 
> ha5] _cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]]) 
 
  (1)  [ [gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+[gamma5]_cons+_b 
[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[5*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons-[alpha5 
> ] _cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+[gamma4]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc] 
*farmlpcm]/[4*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons-[alpha3]_cons-[alpha4]_cons+betas]] 
 
               chi2(1) =        0.08 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.7729 
 
. ([[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons- [alpha3]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlp 
> c]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1] _cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]])    ([[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+_ 
> b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[1*[[alpha1] _cons+betas]]) 
unrecognized command:  ( invalid command name 
r(199); 
 
. testnl([[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons- [alpha3]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL: 
> farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1] _cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]])    ([[gamma1] 
_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]]=[[gamma1]_ 
> cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[1*[[alpha1] _cons+betas]]) 
 
  (1)  [[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+[gamma3]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[3*[[alpha1]_cons-
[alpha2]_cons- [alpha3]_cons+betas]] = [[gamma1]_cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL: 
> farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1] _cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]] 
  (2)  [[gamma1] _cons+[gamma2]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[2*[[alpha1]_cons-[alpha2]_cons+betas]] 
= [[gamma1]_cons+_b[gammaL:farmlpc]*farmlpcm]/[1*[[alpha1] _cons+betas 
> ]] 
 
               chi2(2) =       20.17 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0000 
 
